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Bug #2657
closed
Potential weakness of the captive portal voucher system (design issue)
Status:
Closed
Priority:
Normal
Assignee:
-
Category:
Captive Portal
Target version:
-
Start date:
10/11/2012
Due date:
% Done:
0%
Estimated time:
Plus Target Version:
Release Notes:
Affected Version:
Affected Architecture:
Description
If the holder of a voucher can guess the encoded roll and ticket IDs and magic number (in particular if the default configuration magic number or no magic number at all is used), it is possible to deduce the RSA modulus employed by the voucher system and factor it due to its short length.
See the enclosed paper which has been submitted to the IACR ePrint archive.
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Updated by Chris Buechler almost 13 years ago
This appears to largely be based, at least the "urgent recommendation" part, on a false premise - that there is a default magic number. No such thing exists, the magic number is randomly generated on each system. We're reviewing further.
Updated by Ermal Luçi almost 13 years ago
- Status changed from New to Feedback
For now the exponent has been converted to a random value when generating the keys.
This should mitigate the concerns in the paper.
Updated by Jeremy Porter over 9 years ago
- Status changed from Feedback to Closed
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